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1. Introduction 
There is wide agreement that the EU’s energy Directives have led to a marked concentration in the sector as 
well as an internationalisation of previously nationally based companies. In 2002, Thomas penned the term, 
‘the Seven Brothers’ to describe the companies that were becoming increasingly dominant across Europe1. In 
fact, the Seven Brothers then comprised ‘three big brothers’, EDF of France, and RWE and E.ON of 
Germany, plus a handful of significantly smaller companies all jostling to reposition themselves so they 
could compete with the big brothers. This set of companies included Endesa, Iberdrola, (both of Spain) 
ENEL (Italy), Vattenfall (Sweden) and Suez/Electrabel (Belgium/France). By 2007, if the three major 
takeovers and mergers are completed, the main competitors will be the same ‘three big brothers’ (E.ON is 
trying to take over Endesa) with four smaller brothers, Electrabel/Distrigaz/GDF, Iberdrola/Scottish Power, 
Vattenfall and ENEL (see Table 1). Note that changes in group turnover can be misleading, sometimes being 
caused by major movements in consumer prices and sometimes by acquisitions and divestments. 
Table 1.  Financial size of the ‘Seven Brothers’ 
 Turnover 2006 €bn (% annual 
increase) 
E.ON + Endesa* 67.8 (+21) + 18.2 (+33) = 86.0 
EDF 58.9 (+15)  
RWE 44.3 (+12) 
Iberdrola + SP† 11.0 (-5) + 8.2 (+19) = 19.2 
Electrabel* + Distrigaz* + GDF 12.2 (+7) + 3.8 (+29) + 27.6 (+21) = 43.6 
ENEL* 34.1 (+10) 
Vattenfall 16.1 (+18) 
Sources: Annual reports and accounts 
Notes: 
1 Figures marked * are for 2005 and figures marked † are for FY 2005/06 
2. €1=$1.33 
3. €1=SEK9.05 (2006), €1=SEK9.43 (2005). 
Table 2.  Financial size of the major national and regional energy companies 
 Turnover 2006 €bn (% annual increase) 
Centrica◊ 24.8 (+22) 
Scottish & Southern* 15.2 (+37) 
Essent/Nuon 6.4 (+9) + 5.6 (+12) = 12 
EDP* 9.2 (+36) 
Union Fenosa 6.1 (-1) 
Fortum 4.5 (+16) 
CEZ* 4.5 (+22) 
Verbund 2.9 (+35) 
DONG 4.8 (+103) 
EVN 2.1 (+29) 
Statkraft 2.0 (+8) 
PPC 4.3 (+5) 
Sources: Annual reports and accounts 
Notes: 
1 Figures marked * are for 2005 
1 Figures marked ◊ are preliminary results for 2006 
2. €1=$1.33 
3. €1=NOK8 (Statkraft) 
4. €1=CZK28 (CEZ) 
5. €1=DKK7.5 (DONG) 
There were four major mergers in this sector in March 2007 (see below for more details): 
 A takeover of Endesa (Spain) by E.ON (Germany); 
 A takeover of Scottish Power (UK) by Iberdrola (Spain); 
 A merger of Suez (France/Belgium) with GDF (France); and 
                                                     
1 S D Thomas (2003) ‘The seven brothers’ Energy Policy, vol 31, 5, pp 393-403. 
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 A merger of Essent and Nuon (both Netherlands). 
The analysis in this paper is mainly based on an assumption that these deals will be completed, although 
there were significant problems to be resolved for all these changes, especially the Endesa/E.ON and 
Suez/GDF moves. 
This paper examines developments for these companies since 2003, including takeover and merger activity 
and changes in corporate focus. For these purposes, we can divide the EU up into eight main regional or 
national markets: The UK, Germany, France, Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, the Nordic market, the Benelux 
countries and Eastern Europe. The Member States that do not fall into these markets tend to be small and/or 
isolated markets that cannot realistically contribute to Single European electricity and gas markets. We focus 
only on the seven companies that have a significant presence in more than one of these markets. Other 
significant companies are primarily national or regional companies (see Table 2), such as Fortum (Finland), 
Statkraft (Norway), EVN and Verbund (Austria), DONG (Denmark), Essent/Nuon (Netherlands), CEZ 
(Czech Republic), Union Fenosa (Spain), EDP (Portugal/Spain), PPC (Greece) and Scottish & Southern and 
Centrica (UK). 
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2. The Seven Brothers 
2.1. EDF 
At the start of 2007, EDF was the largest of the Big Brothers but will be overtaken by E.ON in 2007 if the 
takeover of Endesa is completed. In 2002, it was still fully owned by the French State and was a significant 
player in electricity markets outside Europe as well as in Europe. In particular, it was a major player in Latin 
America through its control of the main electricity distribution company in Rio de Janeiro (Light) and the 
main Buenos Aires distributor (Edenor). In Europe, its main activities outside France were in UK, where it 
had holdings in generation, distribution and retail, Germany, through its control of one of the four main 
companies, EnBW, Sweden, through its holding in Graninge, Spain, through its holding in Hidrocantabrico 
and Italy through its attempts to gain control of Edison. 
Since then, EDF has been part-privatised with the sale of about 13 per cent of the shares in an IPO in 
October 2005. It remains to be seen whether further shares will be sold. The main strategic development was 
EDF’s withdrawal from markets outside Europe, following heavy losses in their South American holdings 
and, in the 2005 Annual Report, EDF characterised itself as ‘a group focused on Europe’. It had also had 
mixed fortunes in its attempts to expand in Europe. In 2003, it sold its stake in Graninge to E.ON leaving it 
with no significant presence in the Nordic market and, in 2004, it sold its stake in Hidrocantabrico to EDP, 
the Portuguese utility, leaving it with minimal presence in the Iberian market. 
However, in May 2005, after a long political battle, it took joint control (with AEM Milan) of Edison, the 
second largest player in the Italian electricity market and the third largest player in the gas market. In the 
UK, by 2002, it already had major holdings in generation, distribution (London and Eastern), retail (London 
and SWEB). It added the retail and distribution business of SEEBOARD in 2002. In Germany it has also 
increased its stake in EnBW from 33 per cent to 45 per cent since 2002. 
In Eastern Europe, it has a limited presence. In Hungary, it has a majority stake in a distribution company, 
Demasz and a minority stake (through EnBW) in two further distribution companies as well as stakes in 
various generation plants. It also has minority stakes in power plants in Czech Republic, stakes in various 
companies in Poland, a minority stake in a distribution company in Slovakia. 
In France, EDF has legally unbundled its transmission network (RTE) but there are no plans for EDF to sell 
its stake in RTE and it has yet to meet the EU requirement to legally unbundle the distribution network. 
EDF is not currently linked with further merger and acquisition activity in Europe and appears to be 
consolidating so it has a position of strength in the contiguous markets of Italy, UK and Germany. 
2.2. E.ON/Endesa 
E.ON has been the most aggressive company on the mergers and acquisitions front since 2002. In 2002, its 
main foreign holdings were in the UK through its ownership of the UK generator Powergen, which already 
had interests in distribution (Midlands and East Midlands) and retail (Eastern, Norweb and East Midlands).  
Its other significant holdings were in Sweden (29 per cent of Sydkraft and 13 per cent of Graninge), Finland 
(34 per cent of Espoon Sakho) and the Netherlands (ownership of the generation company, EZH) 
E.ON sold its shares in Espoon Sakho back to Fortum (it had acquired them from Fortum in 2002) after a 
very politically-driven process. However, it took control of both Sydkraft and Graninge to make E.ON the 
second largest electricity company in Sweden (behind Vattenfall). In 2005, it complemented its purchase in 
2000 of the Dutch generator, EZH with the purchase of the fifth largest electricity company, NRE, which had 
275,000 electricity and gas consumers. 
It also has a strong presence in Eastern Europe. It was one of the first Western electricity companies to move 
into Bulgaria acquiring 67 per cent of the distribution companies, Varna and Gorna Oryahovitsa at the 
beginning of 2005, which distribute power to more than a million consumers. The Bulgarian government still 
holds the remaining shares. In the Czech Republic, E.ON consolidated all its majority holdings (JME and 
JCE) into E.ON Ceska, E.ON Energie and E.ON Distribuce. E.ON made its first major acquisition in 
Romania in 2005, when it took 51 per cent stakes in the gas distribution company, Distrigaz Nord, which has 
over a million customers and the electricity company, Electrica Moldova with about 1.3 million consumers. 
In both cases, the shares were acquired from the Romanian government. 
However, its most audacious moves have been in Western Europe. It attempted to take over Scottish Power 
in 2005, but this effort failed. For the future, the major development will be the acquisition of the largest 
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electricity company in Spain, Endesa. This had been subject to a takeover bid by the Spanish gas company, 
Gas Natural, but in February 2006, E.ON outbid them with a cash offer worth €29.1bn. By January 2007, 
E.ON had raised its bid twice, to €41bn, most regulatory hurdles appeared to have been cleared and Gas 
Natural had withdrawn its offer. However, by March, the takeover was in doubt, with ENEL, the Italian 
company, taking a rival postion in the company and potentially blocking majority control. If E.ON succeeds 
in its takeover of Endesa, the combined group would leap-frog EDF of France as Europe's biggest power 
company. More significantly, it would give E.ON its first significant footholds in the Spanish, French and 
Italian markets, giving it positions in all the main markets of Europe. 
Endesa is one of the two large utilities that dominate the Spanish electricity market owning 22,400MW of 
generation. It was created in 1983 from the merger of a number of companies and was fully state-owned. In 
1988, the Spanish government began to sell shares and now it holds less than 10 per cent of the shares. It is 
the number one private sector multinational electricity company in Latin America with 14000MW of 
generation, being the largest company in Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Peru. However, in Europe, outside 
Spain, its activities are limited. Its main activities are in Italy, Portugal and France. 
In Italy, its subsidiary Endesa Italia (80 per cent owned by Endesa, the rest being held by ASM Brescia) 
owns 6590MW of generation acquired from ENEL in 2001 as part of the forced divestment of generation 
from ENEL. In March 2004, it acquired a further 35 per cent of the French generation company, SNET 
(2600MW) to take a 65 per cent controlling interest. The other shares are owned by CDF and EDF, the major 
French coal and electricity companies respectively. 
2.3. RWE 
Like E.ON, in 2002, RWE’s main foreign base was the UK where it held a comparable holding through its 
ownership of the UK generator National Power, which brought with it ownership of retail businesses 
(Yorkshire, Northern and Midlands). It has no network businesses in UK. 
Unlike E.ON, RWE has not developed its position in mainland Western Europe to any great extent, apart 
from a small gas business in Netherlands (Obragas). Outside Germany and UK, its main activities are in 
Eastern Europe. It controls distribution companies in Hungary ELMU (55 per cent) and EMAZS (54 per 
cent) and a generating company (MATRA, 51 per cent). In the Czech Republic it owns Transgas (the gas 
transmission company) and 6 regional utilities. In Poland it controls STOEN (85 per cent), the major 
distributor in Warsaw. 
In 2006, it finally sold its main water company, Thames Water (UK) and is expected to sell American Water 
in 2007. 
2.4. Iberdrola 
Iberdrola, Spain's second-largest generator, is currently completing an agreed £11.6bn (€17.5bn) takeover of 
Scottish Power that would create Europe's fourth-biggest electricity company by market capitalisation, but 
still only the sixth largest company by turnover. This would be Iberdrola’s first significant acquisition in 
Europe outside its home Iberian market, although it does have investments in Latin America. 
Scottish Power was present in two main markets, the UK and USA, where it controlled Pacificorp (Pacific 
North West), but Scottish Power announced the sale of Pacificorp in 2005.  
2.5. Electrabel/Distrigaz/GDF 
The Suez-GDF merger may go ahead, as no other investors have offered a bid, but it still remains politicised 
and is an issue in the French presidential elections. The prospects for a merged business are difficult to 
evaluate because it is not clear what businesses it will choose to divest and which assets it will be required to 
divest to satisfy the competition authorities. Suez’s water and waste business is large but has few synergies 
with the energy businesses, so it is probably more appropriate to omit it from the analyses. If the merger is 
completed, it may well be that the water and waste business will be sold off. 
Electrabel is the largest power company in the Benelux region, being the dominant company in Belgium, but 
having a strong position also in the Netherlands. It has recently taken significant positions in France and 
Italy. In total, it employed 15794 people at the end of 2006. Its main shareholder is Tractebel (100 per cent 
owned by Suez), the energy arm of Suez which had 50.1 per cent and in 2005, increased its stake to 98.6 per 
cent. Important energy assets include Tractebel’s shares in Distrigaz (47 per cent), the main Belgian gas 
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company and Fluxys, the Belgian gas network company, although Tractebel’s main electricity activity in 
Europe is consultancy, services and engineering. 
Outside Belgium, where Electrabel owns about 13000MW of plant, its main activity in electricity is 
generation. It has about 4.7GW of capacity in Netherlands mainly from the takeover of the EPON generation 
company. In France, it owns about 4.8GW of plant and its activities include: its control of CNR; control of 
SHEM and its share of two nuclear plants. In Italy, it owns 2.2GW, Hungary, 1.7GW, Poland 1.7GW, 
Luxembourg 0.4GW, and in Germany, Spain and Portugal it has a small amount of plant. 
Over the period from March 2006, developments have been dominated by the attempt, apparently backed by 
the French government, by Suez and Gaz de France (GDF) to merge. This appears to have thwarted an 
attempt by ENEL to take over Suez. French backing for the GDF/Suez merger caused considerable 
opposition, notably from the Italian government. However, the French courts and the Parliament delayed the 
merger on grounds that workers at GDF had not been properly informed on the consequences of the merger. 
By January 2007, it was still not clear who would end up owning Suez and, indeed, GDF. Potential bidders 
for Suez include RWE, E.ON and ENEL and perhaps even private equity firms (for example, Francois 
Pinault). 
GDF is the main French gas company and has significant holdings in Eastern Europe. Until July 2005, it was 
fully publicly owned by the French State, but then, about 20 per cent of the shares were sold by IPO, 17.5 per 
cent to investors (11.4 per cent to institutional investors, the rest individuals) and 2.3 per cent to employees. 
If the proposed merger with Suez was to be completed, the group would have to be fully privatised. Its major 
downstream foreign holdings are in gas distribution: 
 Germany, where it owns 31.6 per cent of Groupe Gasag and 43 per cent of Megal; 
 Hungary, where it owns 99.8 per cent of the Degaz and 99.4 per cent of Egaz; 
 Portugal, where it owns 12.8 per cent of Portgas; 
 Slovakia, where it owns 43.4 per cent of Pozagas and 24.5 per cent of SPP; and 
 Romania, where it owns 51 per cent of Distrigaz Sud. 
It owns 25.2 per cent of SPE, the second largest energy supplier in Belgium, which owns power stations as 
well as retailing electricity and gas to final consumers and employees about 1000 people. 
It took a stake in Gasag in 1998, the largest end distributor of gas in Germany that serves Berlin, when the 
City sold 52 per cent of the stock. GDF initially took a majority stakes in Degaz and Egaz in the 1990s, but 
increased this to nearly 100 per cent in 2004 buying 35 per cent and a 27 per cent stakes respectively from 
Mol (stakes Mol bought in 1998). In July 2006, it merged the two companies to form Egaz-Degaz. 
GDF took a 30 per cent stake in the Slovak storage company, Pozagas. SPP is the monopoly Slovak gas 
distribution company, 51 per cent owned by the Slovak government, with the rest split between GDF and 
E.ON since 2002. Gazprom had an option to take a third of the GDF/E.ON stake but has not exercised it. 
Distrigaz Sud is the largest Romanian gas distributor, based mainly in Bucharest. Distrigaz Nord, the other 
large Romanian gas distributor is controlled by E.ON. 
Distrigaz is majority (57 per cent) owned by Suez, which also owns 57 per cent of Distrigaz’s former 
networks division, Fluxys. The remaining shares are held by Publigas (the holding company of the Belgian 
municipalities) 31 per cent and the rest are traded on the Brussels stock exchange. The Belgian government 
owns a Golden Share. About 12 per cent of its sales are outside Belgium but most of its foreign activities are 
in part ownership of pipelines, for example, 14 per cent of the Interconnector from Belgium to UK.  
It is not clear what would happen to Distrigaz if the merger of GDF and Suez was to be completed, although 
it has been reported that GDF and Suez have agreed that Suez would sell its share in Distrigaz if the merger 
was completed. Gazprom and ENI (Italy) have been mentioned as possible buyers. 
2.6. Vattenfall 
Vattenfall is the main Swedish energy company. It is 100 per cent owned by the Swedish state. While 
privatisation of Vattenfall (and other Swedish state-owned assets) has been proposed by some political 
parties, there are no immediate plans to privatise Vattenfall. It is the largest power company in the Nordic 
region and the fifth largest in Europe. It has a strong presence in Germany through its Vattenfall Europe 
subsidiary, in Finland and in Poland. It acquired its position in Germany by taking over the Berlin electricity 
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company, BeWAG, the Hamburg electricity company, HEW and the East German electricity company, 
VEAG. 
In 2005, Vattenfall acquired 35.3 per cent of the shares in Elsam, then the largest Danish electricity company 
with a view to taking it over. After negotiations with the Danish natural gas company, DONG, which also 
wanted to take over Elsam, Vattenfall exchanged the shares for a number of Danish CHP and wind power 
plants with a total generation capacity of approximately 2500MW (e) and 2100 MW heat. 
2.7. ENEL 
ENEL is the major electricity company in Italy. It was fully state-owned until 1999 when 34.5 per cent of the 
shares were sold. In 2003, a further 6 per cent was sold and by 2007, the state holding was 30.6 per cent. Its 
main activities outside Italy are its ownership of: 
 the Spanish utility, Viesgo, bought from Endesa in 2001; 
 control of Bulgaria’s largest power plant, Maritza East III (840MW, lignite), 2003; 
 control (51 per cent) of Slovenske Elektrarne (SE), the largest electricity generator in the Slovak 
Republic, 2005; 
 control (51 per cent) of Electrica Banat and Electrica Dobrogea, electricity distributors in Romania 
with 1.4 m customers; 
 operation in partnership with the local private group ESN Energo of the North-West Thermal Power 
Plant in St. Petersburg, Russia in June 2004. 
Its attempts to derail the takeover by E.ON of Endesa in March 2007 and its interest in Suez, not pursued, 
indicate the high ambitions of ENEL as an international player, but it has a lot of ground to make up in terms 
of international coverage to rival some of its competitors. 
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3. Corporate policies 
3.1. Competitive positions 
The record of the corporate policies of the energy companies in the last decade has been poor and attempts to 
build multi-utilities and to move outside Europe have often been expensive failures. The priority for the 
major companies would be to move into new markets to compensate for the likely loss of their network 
assets and, for companies with dominant national positions, loss of market share in the home markets. The 
large increases in turnover for the Seven Brothers (see Table 1) in the past year or two are driven by major 
increases in energy prices rather than any increase in scale and are rather misleading. In this light, the modest 
increases in turnover of RWE, ENEL and Electrabel suggest a relative weakening of these groups. The key 
priorities for most of the Seven Brothers therefore seem to be to increase geographical coverage, especially 
in contiguous markets and to strengthen positions in gas. 
Table 3.  Market positions of the ‘Seven Brothers’ 
 UK Germany France Italy Benelux Nordic Iberia E Europe 
E.ON + Endesa S H L S S S H S 
EDF S S H S    L 
RWE S H      S 
Iberdrola + SP H      H  
Electrabel + 
Distrigaz + GDF 
 L H S H   S 
ENEL    H   L S 
Vattenfall  H?    H  S 
Note 
1. Entries marked ‘H’ are home markets, ‘S’ are significant holdings and ‘L’ are limited holdings. 
We can divide Europe up into eight regional/national markets (see Table 3)2. While there has been a 
scramble by most of the Seven Brothers to acquire businesses in Eastern Europe, the markets are rather small 
and the competition to buy them has more to do with the expected profitability of these businesses and the 
fact that they were available to buy than any great strategic advantage. The Nordic market is much larger but 
the gas market is small and the energy market is carved up between the major national players, Vattenfall 
(Sweden), Statkraft (Norway), Fortum (Finland) and DONG (Denmark). It seems unlikely that companies 
from outside the Nordic region will be able to establish themselves in the region (except E.ON, which 
already has a significant market position). The Iberian market is large, but relatively self-contained so is also 
perhaps less important than the Central European markets of Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux 
countries. The UK market is also large and relatively self-contained, but entry by foreign companies is the 
easiest in Europe and the existing companies UK operations have been highly profitable. There are also two 
major UK companies remaining, Centrica and Scottish & Southern Energy that look attractive take-over 
targets to companies with sufficient resources to mount a bid 
The proposed new E.ON/Endesa group has by far the best coverage with a presence in all eight markets, as 
‘home’ supplier in two of them and is probably the only non-French company to have a position that could 
form the basis of a significant energy business in France. It is strong in gas in most of these markets. 
EDF is also strong in the five main markets although its roots in France as the national electric utility mean it 
is much weaker in gas than E.ON. Its efforts to acquire significant positions in the Nordic and Iberian 
markets failed and it suffers from suspicions that its strength has more to do with strong French government 
backing than its corporate virtues. 
Apart from its holdings in Eastern Europe, RWE only has a presence in two markets, but it has a strong 
position in gas. Iberdrola stands out as being inexperienced in Europe outside its home markets, having a 
limited position in gas and, if the takeover of Scottish Power is completed, its main markets are totally 
disconnected from each other. It remains to be seen whether the two constituent businesses will amount to 
more than the sum of the parts. 
ENEL has been plagued by changes in management direction with abandoned forays into telecoms and the 
media and may have missed the chance to acquire major companies in the significant markets. Its positions 
                                                     
2 The categorisation of what is a ‘significant’, what is a ‘limited’ and, in some cases, what is a ‘home’ market is 
necessarily somewhat arbitrary. 
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in Spain and France do not seem to have added much to the group and even in Eastern Europe, it may have 
entered too late to acquire the best companies. It remains to be seen whether its attempts to enter the French 
market by participating in the new French nuclear programme will be more successful. 
By comparison, the proposed Electrabel/Distrigaz/GDF grouping looks to have much better geographical 
grouping of markets, strength in gas and scope to develop positions in Germany and Italy. It seems to have 
much the best position to develop a strong position in electricity as well as gas in France.  
Vattenfall had to stretch its resources to acquire its position in Germany and it is only in the last year or two 
that it has begun to be mentioned again as a possible predator. It failed in its attempt to acquire an integrated 
position in the Danish market. Whether government ownership and limited resources will mean that 
Vattenfall will find it difficult to expand beyond its present size remains to be seen. 
3.2. What will happen to networks? 
From a strategic point of view, the utilities that are still integrated in networks and competitive activities will 
fight to retain ownership of the networks as a matter of principle. However, if Regulators are able to enforce 
open and fair access to networks, what benefit will there be to companies in owning the network? There will 
be no commercial synergies with their retail and wholesale businesses and the technical synergies are very 
limited. What they offer is a ‘bulk’ and a low-risk, low rate-of-return business to balance the more cyclical 
and risky wholesale and retail energy businesses. So unbundling networks is a battle the Commission could 
fight with some expectation of being successful. Whether it is a battle they should be fighting is another 
matter. The decision of the EU Energy Council not to explicitly advocate ‘ownership unbundling’ has been 
widely interpreted as an indication of a lack of political support for ownership unbundling.3 Until legal 
unbundling has been given a chance to work (many countries have not been implemented yet it fully yet), the 
decision to increase unbundling seems premature. 
This is in contrast to the issue of unbundling wholesale and retail activities. Here there are massive 
commercial synergies and integrated wholesaler/retailers will not allow this form of de-integration. On 
grounds of security of supply, if not competition, there are strong reasons from a consumer point of view 
why forcing a separation of wholesale and retail should not happen. 
If the Commission is able to force through a requirement for full ownership unbundling of networks, this will 
raise at least two major questions: 
 What will the companies do with the money they earn from selling off the networks? and 
 Who will take over ownership of the networks? 
The former question is discussed in the Section 3.3. The latter question is much more difficult to answer. For 
the transmission networks, the scale of the assets is relatively limited and the strategic importance of an 
efficient and reliable network so overwhelming that this will be a major national political issue. Some 
countries will follow the trend of bringing the transmission networks into national ownership. Other 
countries may create private national transmission companies, as the UK and Spain have done. So far, no 
national transmission company has fallen into foreign ownership and the political discussions that arise when 
this does happen will be interesting. 
The distribution networks are much less politically contentious. The UK has most experience of unbundled 
distribution companies and the companies that have been unbundled have been bought by a diverse range of 
companies, including relatively small Pacific Rim energy companies, e.g., YTL, venture capitalists, e.g. 
MacQuairie and pension funds. It is too early to judge how effective their stewardship of these important 
assets will be. 
Unbundling will almost certainly lead to a massive wave of mergers and take-overs. It is difficult to see a 
future for a small network-only company. Local authorities will see little benefit in owning a network that is 
no more than a common carrier for competing companies. It seems likely that most countries that at present 
have a large number of publicly-owned distribution companies will see a quick collapse into just a handful of 
privately-owned companies. 
                                                     
3 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/trans/92802.pdf  
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3.3. Who are the prime take-over targets? 
Inevitably, in the frequent rounds of take-over activity, the medium size companies, that offer significant 
positions in national markets are discussed as take-over targets (see Table 2). At present, the two remaining 
UK companies, Centrica and Scottish & Southern energy seem to be at the top of the list, although their size 
means that only the largest of the ‘Seven’ will readily find the cash to make a bid. Other potential targets are 
Union Fenosa and EDP (Iberian market), former municipal companies in Italy and the main Dutch 
companies. Some of the other companies are likely to be seen as strategic national resources, for example, 
CEZ, in its 2005 annual report, the headline on the front page is: ‘Czech national champion with 
international reach’4. This, and public ownership, may mean that companies like CEZ, DONG, Verbund, 
Statkraft and, perhaps, Fortum will not be receptive to offers. 
If unbundling of distribution/retail is enforced, there will be a large number of small retail-only companies 
up for sale. A small retail-only energy company seems even more unsustainable than a small distribution 
only company and locally-owned companies in particular will be sold to private investors as public 
authorities seek to exit such a highly risky and unstable business. 
If the main companies are forced to divest their networks, this will provide them with resources to make new 
acquisitions and competition could be intense amongst them, especially those companies, like ENEL and 
Iberdrola that have entered late and have ground to make up. From outside the EU, it seems highly unlikely 
that the shareholders of the US companies will allow them to come back given their inept efforts 5-10 years 
ago. The other non-European companies are probably not large enough to compete except for the Japanese 
companies, but these have shown no interest in European markets so far. This leaves the Russian companies, 
especially Gazprom, as the most likely non-EU predator. If Gazprom does finally make a concrete bid for a 
significant European company, the political discussions will be politically highly charged. 
                                                     
4 http://www.cez.cz/presentation/eng/instance_view.jsp?instance_id=90985&folder_id=9307  
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4. What are the consequences for stakeholders? 
While the strategic issues discussed above are interesting, the most important issues are the consequences for 
the stakeholders, especially energy consumers and employees. The positive factors for allowing the market 
to become dominated by a handful of large companies are that it is easier to put pressure on large companies 
to fulfil their social obligations of being good employers, fulfilling training needs, carrying out R&D and 
behaving ethically. The large companies will also have the good sense not to allow the system to collapse in 
the way the energy companies in California did where exploitation of the system effectively ‘killed the goose 
that laid the golden egg’. 
From a consumer point of view, they are much more problematic. A handful of giant companies will not 
need to collude to know that their best interests in terms of profits will be to limit competition, not indulging 
in aggressive pricing whilst still maintaining a façade of competition. Entry by significant new competitors 
seems implausible and every company taken over will be a company that is not replaced. For the smallest 
companies, this will mean consumers will lose a local supplier, often publicly owned, that has served them 
well over several decades. The middle-sized companies will be swallowed by the large companies and not 
replaced by new entrants and in many cases, national businesses will be swallowed by multi-national 
companies. 
Large electricity and gas multinational companies also pose a democratic problem due to their large size, 
plentiful resources and influence. This should imply that if such large companies are allowed to exist, new 
ways of democratic control should be explored both internally and externally. Internally the rights of workers 
and the trade unions to information and consultation should be considerably strengthened, possibly requiring 
a separate regime also at the European level with strengthened powers for the European Works Councils in 
the multinational companies. External control will come through strengthened stakeholder processes and 
serious Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance programmes that involve communities 
and other stakeholders. To prevent such companies ‘capturing’ the regulators, also these need to be 
democratised and given ample resources to allow for stakeholder scrutiny of corporate strategies and 
company business plans.  
While it is easy to argue for the break up of these large companies, the alternative may be a series of smaller 
regionally based companies that have near monopolies in their geographic area. A series of smaller 
companies that do battle with each other could drive prices below marginal costs and bankrupt companies. 
The Commission seems to have an agenda in favour of creating strong European companies to compete in 
world markets coupled with a belief that it can handle oligopolistic markets. In this case, this does not seem a 
good policy. Experience to date suggests that markets outside will not be profitable or attractive to European 
companies and it is questionable whether the Commission really does have the skills, the political will and 
the power to deal with oligopolies. 
